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LAGOONS, LITTER AND THE LAW: 
CAFO REGULATION AS SOCIAL RISK POLITICS * 
Larry L. Burmeister 
Department of Sociology 
University of Kentucky 
ABSTRACT The restructuring of the animal agriculture indus- 
try in the United States, a response to globalization dynamics 
within the world economy, has created a new social risk profile 
which did not exist in this industry prior to the adoption of factory 
farm technology. Analysis of the CAFO [concentrated animal 
feeding operation] regulation debate in Kentucky illustrates the 
political economy genesis of social risk politics accompanying 
this new technology. The politics of regulatory efforts to amelio- 
rate such risk, an increasingly frequent occurrence in the risk so- 
ciety era, are examined in a recent attempt to promulgate a CAFO 
regulatory regime in Kentucky. This case study shows how 
globalization processes within the U.S. agri-food system have en- 
gendered local re-regulation responses in attempts to alter the lo- 
cation-specific socioeconomic effects of these processes. 
Globalization Dynamics and the Restructured 
U.S. Livestock Industry 
In the swine and poultry subsectors of animal agriculture, vertically- 
integrated structures of production have changed the farm economy 
and rural communities in dramatic ways (Barkema and Novack 
2001; Drabenstott, Henry, and Mitchell 2000). Farmers now 
contract with agribusiness giants like Tyson's Foods to perform one 
*Research for this paper was conducted under the auspices of United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Regional Research Project S -  
276, "Rural Restructuring: Causes and Consequences of Globalization in 
the U.S. Agri-Food and Natural Resources Systems." I thank two anony- 
mous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft that were quite helpful in 
the revision process. 
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growth phase of the production cycle, with the integrator (agribusi- 
ness firm) providing standardized genetic stock and feedstuffs and 
the farmer providing land, labor, and capital (e.g., confinement 
"grow out" facilities). In the hog subsector, for example, farrow-to- 
finish production practices by independent producers on diversified 
crop and livestock farms are being replaced by spatially-dispersed, 
specialized "batch processWconfinement operations under contract 
with integrators who coordinate the "nodes" of the pork commodity 
chain. The rapidity of structural change in the industry is noted by 
trends in operational size of production units and in sales methods. 
In 2001, large producers (those with inventories of 5,000 head and 
over) accounted for 75 percent of U.S. hog inventories, up from 27 
percent in 1994 (Southard and Haley 2001:4). The number of U.S. 
hogs sold in spot markets has decreased from approximately 87 
percent in 1993 to less than 20 percent in 2000 (Hahn 2002:17). 
The structure of production increasingly resembles that of the poul- 
try industry (Kim and Curry 1993; Rhodes 1995; Sullivan, Va- 
savada, and Smith 2000). From the industry perspective, this sys- 
tem is credited with providing ever-more demanding consumers 
with high-quality, reasonably-priced products through investments 
in and applications of cutting edge technology and business organi- 
zation. Supermarket items like lean generation pork and fast food 
items like chicken nuggets are the end products of such commodity 
chains. A backlash against this production model emerged in the 
1990s, however, as environmental costs, public health dangers, 
problematic contract and labor practices, and animal welfare con- 
cerns began to be charged against claimed,productivity increases by 
vocal critics in the environmental and alternative agriculture move- 
ments and by public officials who had to deal with political fall-out 
from the negative externalities of industrialized animal agriculture. 
The restructuring of the swine and poultry industries described 
above are examples of globalization-induced restructuring of the 
agri-food system during the last two decades (Barboza 2000; Bo- 
nanno et al. 1994; Heffernan 1999; Heffernan and Constance 1994; 
McMichael 1994). What has happened in the agri-food system mir- 
rors trends in the restructuring of many other industries due to glob- 
alization dynamics-financial and labor market deregulation, techno- 
logical change, the growth of market power of multinational firms, 
the expansion of international consumer markets for name-brand 
commodities, and the emergence of new business organization 
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models (McMichael2000; Waters 1995:Ch 4). In the U.S. livestock 
industry, locational shifts of production and processing have ac- 
companied restructuring, with increased concentration of production 
in certain locales where agribusinesses have found favorable physi- 
cal production, environmental regulation, and labor market envi- 
ronments (Furuseth 1997; Gouveia 1994; Hoban et al. 1997; Hub- 
bell and Welsh 1998; Stanley 1994). Although cross-national 
commodity chains in the pork and poultry subsectors of animal ag- 
riculture are not yet as pronounced as in many other commodities 
(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994), the potential exists for substan- 
tially more out-sourcing of inputs and final products by agribusiness 
multinationals headquartered in the United States if costs of U.S. 
production were to increase relative to other world regions. 
The empirical outcomes of globalizing commodity production 
systems are, of course, location-specific. In the case of animal agri- 
culture in the United States, industry restructuring has concentrated 
huge amounts of animal waste in small physical areas, resulting in 
associated environmental concerns that have made the industry a 
flashpoint for controversy during the last decade (Constance and 
Bonanno 1999; DeLind 1995; Furuseth 1997; Hubbell and Welsh 
1998; Martin and Zering 1997; Thu and Durrenberger 1998). As 
Polanyi (1944) argued at mid-century, capitalist development pro- 
ceeds as a "double movement," with economic growth and sectoral 
displacement countered by strong sociopolitical pressures from de- 
clining sectors and negatively impacted communities for policies to 
deal with socioeconomic loss. As an illustration of the double 
movement, political contestation of the negative environmental 
side-effects of industrialized animal agriculture has resulted in regu- 
latory efforts at the local and state levels in U.S. states where the 
poultry and swine subsectors are now concentrated (Sullivan, Va- 
savada, and Smith 2000). Such processes are chronicled weekly in 
the "Hog Insider" section of the agribusiness trade journal Feed- 
stufJs. As Kalb (2000) notes, globalization processes fueled by mar- 
ket deregulation (neoliberal policies) have generated a re-regulation 
response, as localities attempt to alter location-specific globalization 
trajectories-a process Kalb (2000: 13) has dubbed "glocalization." 
A case study of a location-specific regulatory response, the debate 
over a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) regulatory 
regime in Kentucky, is the topic of this paper. 
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The major contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, the 
paper shows how the restructured U.S. livestock industry manifests 
both "old" market risks and "new" technological risks. This dual 
risk profile illustrates how globalization processes, as embodied in 
the restructured livestock industry, not only enhance the dangers 
from new risks identified by risk society theorists, but may also 
exacerbate old risks which many thought were mitigated by twenti- 
eth century welfare state policies now being dismantled in the pre- 
sent neoliberal political climate (an important ideological manifesta- 
tion of globalization). As illustrated in the Kentucky case, the po- 
litical economy of risk generates regulatory conflict that is mani- 
fested in a new type of politics that, according to risk society theo- 
rists, delineates this new phase of modernity. Second, the paper 
develops a "meso" level analysis of how such risk society politics 
unfold in a particular locale. This case study identifies policy do- 
main structures (organizational and institutional nexes of issue- 
specific policy action), legislative action stages and processes, and 
other relevant political variables that need to be explored in future 
cross-state or cross-national analyses of regulatory regimes that 
emerge in response to the social risks attending globalization proc- 
esses. Through such analytical frameworks, we can begin to under- 
stand the extent to which location-specific political institutions alter 
globalization trajectories at the local level. 
Methods 
Evidence for the arguments presented in this paper consists of 
fieldnotes I took at public hearings on CAFO regulations conducted 
by the Kentucky Division of Water; a review of publications and 
website materials on CAFO issues distributed by state agencies, 
industry interest groups and trade associations, alternative agricul- 
ture organizations, and environmental organizations; and a compila- 
tion of media articles on the CAFO debate. I attended four public 
hearings on CAFO regulations over 1998-2000 in Bowling Green, 
KY (1122198), Frankfort, KY (6/25198), Cadiz, KY (9/21/98), and 
Madisonville, KY (6125100). To an important extent, data em- 
ployed in the political economy of risk and risk politics sections of 
the paper (sections IV and V) consist of my paraphrases of pro- and 
anti-regulation perspectives voiced in public hearings by individuals 
who made public statements. Since there was much overlap in indi- 
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vidual hearings in terms of participants and viewpoints expressed, 
my representation of the CAFO debate discourse is a composite of 
public hearing testimony I observed. This data is referenced as 
"author's fieldnotes" in the text. The validity of my representation 
of this discourse may be cross-checked through perusal of verbatim 
transcripts of the individual hearings that may be obtained through 
the Kentucky Division of Water. Newspaper articles are also cited 
as supporting documentation of the unfolding of the CAFO regula- 
tion debate and administrative and regulatory action. 
Background to the CAFO Regulation Debate in Kentucky 
In the summer of 1997, Kentucky Governor Paul Patton (Democrat) 
issued an executive order that placed a moratorium on permits for 
large-scale hog operations until regulations governing their opera- 
tion could be put in place. The moratorium came in response to 
several western Kentucky county executives' (elected Judge- 
Executives in Kentucky) requests for regulatory action in the wake 
of announcements of plans to establish large-scale hog farms in 
their counties. Vall, Inc. of Texhoma, Oklahoma, a subsidiary of a 
Spanish firm of the same name, purchased 3,200 acres of reclaimed 
strip mine land in Hopkins and Christian Counties in southwestern 
Kentucky and declared plans to produce up to 500,000 hogs per 
year. In neighboring Hickman County, a local entrepreneur backed 
by Carroll Foods, Inc. of Warsaw, North Carolina, began construc- 
tion of a large sow-breeding operation. Immediately, citizen oppo- 
sition in those localities surfaced when these plans became public, 
spurring the moratorium response by the governor (see Associated 
Press 1997; Bishop 1997a, 1997b; Community Farm Alliance 1997; 
Fernandez and Brammer 1997; Muhs and Brammer 1997; Wagar 
1997). 
Important structure of agriculture and rural politics parallels be- 
tween North Carolina and Kentucky made Kentucky a likely site for 
production expansion by vertically-integrated North Carolina hog 
firms afier regulatory initiatives loomed in North Carolina in the 
wake of serious industry pollution problems (Thu and Durrenberger 
1994). Like the hog production areas of North Carolina, rural west- 
ern Kentucky had a faltering tobacco economy that had been the 
economic mainstay of many small farms, familiarity with contract 
farming in nearby poultry operations, a hostile union environment 
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for processors, and weak land zoning rules (Furuseth 1997). And 
western Kentucky is located in the Corn Belt, providing a local 
feedgrain supply for vertically-integrated hog production. 
Earlier in his first term of office, Governor Patton had welcomed 
large poultry operations by offering various economic incentives 
designed to attract processing plants to depressed rural counties in 
the western part of the state. Tax breaks, infrastructure support, and 
worker training assistance were among the subsidies offered as part 
of a wider rural development strategy to attract industry (Lexington 
Herald-Leader 2000, Lindenberger 2000a). While Seaboard Farms 
had established a western Kentucky beachhead in the early 1990s 
before Patton came into office, Perdue, Cagle's-Keystone, and Hud- 
son (since bought out by Tyson) were enticed to invest in processing 
facilities during Patton's first term. As a result, Kentucky became 
the 13' largest broiler producer in the United States in 2000, pro- 
ducing over 200,000,000 birds, as the processors quickly organized 
new contract production in close proximity to the processing facili- 
ties (Stull 2000). Most recent University of Kentucky College of 
Agriculture data show broiler production now ranking second in 
value among all Kentucky agricultural commodities (Patton 
2002:D6). As shown below in Table 1, the poultry industry has 
grown rapidly in the state during the 1990s, with tremendous in- 
creases in production over a short period of time in several western 
Kentucky counties. Many of these counties had declining popula- 
tions and lagging socioeconomic indicators during the decade of the 
1980s (see Table 2 below). In response to such stagnation, influen- 
tial segments within the affected local communities welcomed poul- 
try industry investment (Lindenberger 2000b). As noted in the data 
in Table 2, by the end of the 1990s population growth had increased 
significantly and economic conditions had improved appreciably in 
many western Kentucky counties. These trends mirrored statewide 
trends. Undoubtedly expansion of the poultry industry contributed 
to these trends in some localities, although broader economic forces, 
including increasing popularity of some western Kentucky counties 
as tourist and retirement destinations, were also responsible for this 
growth. 
Neighboring North Carolina's experience with an explosion of 
swine production over a short period of time undoubtedly strength- 
ened Patton's resolve to put a regulatory regime in place to forestall 
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1 TABLE 1. Trends in Kentucky Broiler Production and 1 
Source: USDAIKentucky Agriculture Statistics Service 2002. 
Kentucky Agricultural Statistics 2000- 2001 Bulletin. 
Value, 1991-2000. 
environmental problems witnessed elsewhere (Furuseth 1997). 
After the original moratorium was announced in the summer of 
1997, regulatory debates continued in each subsequent legislative 
session. In Kentucky, the governor, through the constitutional au- 
thority granted to the executive branch, has the power to use appro- 
priate administrative agencies to promulgate temporary regulations 
to deal with an "emergency" threatening the general public welfare. 
Using this power, the governor authorized the Natural Resources 
and Environmental Protection Cabinet (hereafter NREPC) to issue 
temporary regulations for livestock operations defined as CAFOs. 
In the case of such temporary regulations, the promulgating agency, 
in this case the Division of Water within the NREPC, is required to 
hold public hearings to vet the draft. This provision is designed to 
give the regulatory agency a chance to amend temporary regula- 
tions in response to public concerns. These regulations become per- 
manent (in their original or amended form) with passage by the 
legislature. 
Value of Production 
($l,OOOs) 
24,864 
YEAR 
199 1 
No. Produced 
(1,000s) 
22,000 
Pounds Produced 
(1,000s) 
88,800 
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I Table 2. Socioeconomic Characteristics of CAFO-Site (Poultry) I 
KENTUCKY 1 0.7 1 9.6 122,534 131,730 1 19.0 1 16.0 ( 7.4 1 4.1 
Counties. 
1 TYSONPERDUE CONTRACT AREA I 
CAGLESIKEYSTONE CONTRACT AREA 
I CON-AGRA (formerly Seaboard) CONTRACT AREA 
Net Change in 
Population(%) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000, 1994. 
Median 
Household 
Income ($) 
1980- 
1wn 
Percent Below 
Poverty 
Unemployment 
Rate 
1989 1990- 7nnn 1989 1990 1997 1997 2000 
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Under past precedent, if the legislature failed to approve regula- 
tions emanating from the responsible agency or failed to enact alter- 
natives to what the agency proposed, as happened in the post-1997 
legislative sessions with the temporary CAFO regulations, the tem- 
porary regulations lapsed. The responsible agency had the option to 
draft a new set of temporary regulations that had to be different (the 
legal requirement) from the earlier regulations rejected by the legis- 
lature. This merry-go-round between the executive and legislative 
branches of the state government continued until new legislation 
changing the executive branch's authority to keep temporary emer- 
gency regulations in force was passed at the end of the 2002 General 
Assembly session (Associated Press 2000a, 2000b, 1998; Baniak 
2000; Mead 2000, 1998b; J. Patton 1998b; Wolfe 2000a,b). 
A lawsuit filed by the Kentucky Farm Bureau and other state 
commodity groups set this legislation in motion by contesting the 
constitutionality of executive branch regulatory authority (Associ- 
ated Press 2001; Brammer 2000; KFB 2001; Wolfe 2001). While 
the NREPC won an initial victory in a countersuit (Brammer 2001; 
Yetter 2002), the legislature reacted by passing House Bill 728 
(KFB 2002). The bill became law without Governor Patton's signa- 
ture. This new law requires that any regulation declared "defi- 
cient" by the vetting legislative agency, the Administrative Regula- 
tion Review Subcommittee (which reviews administrative regula- 
tions between legislative sessions), be declared null and void if leg- 
islative approval is not forthcoming in the next session. This law 
means that temporary regulations lapse within a fairly short time 
after promulgation by an executive branch agency if legislative ap- 
proval is not secured. Hence, the most recent temporary CAFO 
regulations (announced by the NREPC in October 2001) are appar- 
ently no longer in force (Duncan 2002). 
At the outset of the CAFO regulation debate, the regulatory ini- 
tiatives focused on planned large-scale hog production facilities. 
Over time, however, the regulatory regime was broadened to incor- 
porate all animal production operations defined as CAFOs--- 
including beef cattle, dairy, poultry, and swine. This omnibus ap- 
proach was in part a response to a federal attempt to provide re- 
sponsible state agencies with guidelines to deal with water quality 
threats posed by CAFOs, namely a presidential executive order to 
incorporate livestock waste run-off into Clean Water Act mandates. 
Joint USDAIEPA CAFO guidelines were drafted in the spring of 
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1999 (EPA 200 1 ; Kaplan, Johansson and Peters 2002). The respon- 
sible Kentucky authority (the aforementioned NREPC) drafted its 
most recent regulations with this federal mandate in mind. The 
rapid growth of the poultry industry in Kentucky at the end of the 
1990s has directed public attention to specific problems associated 
with CAFOs in that livestock subsector (Associated Press 1999). At 
a public hearing in Madisonville on June 6, 2000, almost all the 
public comments supporting a strong regulatory regime were di- 
rected at nearby poultry operations (author's fieldnotes). One 
speaker estimated that a neighboring county had seen 250 chicken 
houses (25,000 birdslhouse) go up during the past year, causing 
widespread citizen complaints about associated environmental prob- 
lems (see also Stull2000). 
There were three main provisions to the NREPC-generated 
CAFO regulations (Frederick 2000). One major provision dealt 
with setback requirements from dwellings, schools, recreation areas, 
and so forth, for animal houses, waste disposal sites, and land appli- 
cations of manure from CAFOs. This provision addressed odor and 
other nuisance complaints (e.g., fly and vermin infestation are 
commonly described problems of neighbors) as well as concerns 
about health impacts on nearby residents. A second major provision 
dealt with water quality standards by requiring CAFOs to obtain 
permits for water and waste discharge. The Division of Water, an 
agency within the NREPC, was charged with monitoring compli- 
ance and ensuring that water quality was not compromised by 
CAFO operations. The final provision made the integrators (corpo- 
rations like Tyson's Foods that contract with farmers for animal 
production and that own the animals and specify production tech- 
nologies used by farmers) jointly liable with farmers for environ- 
mental damages caused by CAFO operations-e.g, clean-up of on- 
farm accidents or production facility closures. 
Throughout the debate over a regulatory regime, a consistent 
line-up of pro- and anti-regulation groups has testified at public 
hearings and lobbied the Cabinet and the legislature (author's field- 
notes). These groups are catalogued in Table 3 below. Basically 
the agricultural industry is anti-regulation and environmental and 
alternative agriculture groups are pro-regulation. In public debates 
on the regulations, the pro- and anti-regulation forces contested all 
of the important provisions of the regulations, with regulations 
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critiqued as not strong enough (the pro-forces) or unnecessarily 
burdensome (the anti-forces)(author's fieldnotes; Lexington Herald- 
Leader 1998; Mead 1998a; Patton 1998b, 1998c) . One study com- 
paring regulatory regimes for hog production placed Kentucky's 
regime in the "restrictive" category (Beghin and Metcalfe 2000). 
However, for both sides in the debate, the provision that defined 
ideas about the ultimate policy impact of these regulations was the 
joint liability provision. This provision illustrated in a most direct 
way the political economy catalysts of Kentucky's CAFO regulation 
debate. 
Globalization and the Social Risk Dimensions of the CAFO 
Regulatory Conflict 
The joint liability provision in the proposed Kentucky CAFO regu- 
latory regime was a flashpoint for both the pro- and anti-regulation 
groups in the debate because it revealed social risk hazards of glob- 
alization-induced economic restructuring in the U.S. livestock in- 
dustry that both sides sought to minimize. What do sociologists 
mean by the term "social risk" (see Beck 1998, 1992; Giddens 
1998)? Social risks are future unwanted outcomes that people seek 
to control or ameliorate when possible. Many modem social risks 
are human-made results of the development projects that define in 
techno-economic terms the industrial and post-industrial eras of 
human history. Paradoxically, technological efforts to harness na- 
ture to benefit humankind can generate physical andlor biological 
system reactions that pose significant hazards to human welfare. 
Giddens (1998:27) differentiates a type of social risk that, his- 
torically, has been predictable and insurable from a type of social 
risk that is less predictable but which is perhaps more threatening to 
human life. The first type of risk he labels "external" to indicate 
that it is imposed from the outside through natural forces or macro- 
level social system fluctuations over which individuals and even 
nations have little control. These events occur often enough that 
knowledge is accumulated about them and thus some ameliorative 
measures can be taken to deal with their negative consequences. 
Cyclical economic fluctuations in capitalist economies are one illus- 
tration, with welfare state social insurance schemes like unemploy- 
ment compensation a common public policy response. Historically, 
11
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1 TABLE 3. Organizational Actors in Kentucky CAFO ( 
Pro-Regulation: 
Community Farm Alliance (alternative agriculture) 
County-Level NIMBY Protest Groups (e.g., McLean County Citizens 
Against Factory Farms) 
Democracy Resource Center (progressive politics) 
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth (progressive politics) 
Kentucky Resources Council (environmental) 
Kentucky Waterways Alliance 
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet 
Sierra Club 
Anti-Regulation: 
Kentucky Cattlemen's Association 
Kentucky Corn Growers' Association 
Kentucky Farm Bureau Federation 
Kentucky Pork Producers' Association 
Kentucky Poultry Federation 
Kentucky Small Grain Growers' Association 
Kentucky Soybean Association 
Kentucky State Department of Agriculture 
I 
Source: Author's fieldnotes. 
private insurance companies have handled many of these external 
risks, such as those stemming from natural disasters. 
The second type of risk, labeled "manufactured risk" by Gid- 
dens, is generated as a by-product of advanced technological sys- 
tems. A wide array of technologies such as nuclear power and ge- 
netic engineering pose this risk threat, perhaps illustrated in starkest 
terms by the Chernobyl disaster. This event was unforeseen and 
hence difficult to plan for andlor insure against. Manufactured risk 
reveals the paradox of modem science. While science continues to 
produce new knowledge leading to breathtaking technological 
achievements, uncertainties grow concerning possible negative side 
effects embedded in these advances (Beck 1999:Ch. 6). Such in- 
terventions in the biophysical and social worlds are promulgated 
without comprehending (or some would argue without truthfully 
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acknowledging) their potential to create adverse system reactions. 
These threats are compounded by the fact that such system-altering 
technologies and products are most often developed and dissemi- 
nated by the private sector using a for-profit decision-making matrix 
that does not cost out negative externalities. 
While participants in the CAFO regulation public hearing did not 
use the risk profile terminology described above, their testimony fit 
these risk profile categories. The anti-regulatory forces, basically 
groups representing the agriculture industry, reacted to the social 
risk of capital flight posed by the joint liability provision of the 
CAFO regulatory regime. They argued that stringent industry regu- 
lations, in particular the joint liability clause, would drive out poten- 
tial swine integrators and stall expansion of the poultry industry. 
According to industry interest groups, contract farming options 
should be open to all interested farmers. Arguments were often 
made that CAFO production systems represent the cutting edge of 
animal agriculture, and that Kentucky farmers must keep pace to 
advance (or even retain) their position in an increasingly competi- 
tive marketplace (author's fieldnotes). 
Interestingly, the social risk of capital flight, an "old" industrial 
society external risk brought about by people's increasing reliance 
on the capitalist market for daily sustenance, has increased for many 
localities and socioeconomic sectors as the result of the neoliberal 
deregulation policies that are key components of the current global- 
ization regime. As the New Deal protectionist safety net for Ken- 
tucky farmers is dismantled (i.e., the tobacco program), capital 
flight and other economic dislocation risks reappear and influence 
policy positions. By arguing against joint liability, industry interest 
groups were in effect saying that farmers must incur more personal 
financial risk in order to protect the industry as a whole from capital 
flight. 
The pro-regulation forces saw the joint liability provision of the 
current CAFO regulations as protection against manufactured risk. 
Perrow (1984) uses the term "normal accident" to describe this type 
of risk. He argues that accidents are routine in tightly-coupled, 
complex industrial production systems. Breakdowns are inevitable 
due to unanticipated failures in a part of the system, which often 
magnifies the seriousness of a problem due to the interconnected- 
ness of complex system components. One glitch reverberates in 
ways that are often not foreseen by engineers and technicians and 
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thus such accidents are difficult to defend against (e.g., engineer 
back-up safety mechanisms to deal with accidents) since there is 
little knowledge of system failures in advance of their occurrence. 
According to Perrow, we should expect such things to happen and 
evaluate the dangers of technologies accordingly. If system failure 
scenarios are too grim, as in the case of nuclear accidents, extreme 
caution should be used in deploying the technologies. 
CAFO production systems, lauded by industry experts as the new 
global standard of production efficiency (Rhodes 1995; Smith 
2001), are good illustrations of how new technologies may pose 
increased social hazards when contrasted with traditional production 
methods. The main danger lies, of course, in the exceedingly dense 
concentrations of animal waste in very confined areas (Gollehon 
and Caswell 2000). The catastrophic accident potential of CAFOs 
was evident three years ago when hog waste treatment lagoons were 
breached by an unexpected natural event, Hurricane Floyd in North 
Carolina (Kilborn 1999). As yet, the extent of environmental dam- 
age caused by this system failure is unclear. Although less dra- 
matic than the breach of CAFO systems by natural disasters, some 
scientists warn of more insidious ground water pollution (Jongbloed 
and Lenis 1998) and public health dangers (Brody 2001; Grady 
2001; MacKenzie 1998) that are consequences of more routine 
normal accidents that they claim plague a technically-problematic 
and poorly-regulated production technology. 
To deal with the reality of normal accidents in industrial systems, 
Perrow argues that either remediable systems must be in place to 
undo damages caused by system failures or alternative techno- 
economic paths that present less catastrophic failure risks should be 
substituted for dangerous technologies. In the Kentucky CAFO 
regulation debate, the statements of pro-regulation advocates im- 
plied that a joint liability provision in the CAFO regulatory regime 
would do one of two things-either encourage the integrators to 
modify production technologies in ways that decrease potential 
damages or stall further integrator investment in the swine and poul- 
try industries (author's fieldnotes). In fact, the latter response has 
seemingly occurred in the swine industry. Hog production in Ken- 
tucky decreased to an all-time low in 2000 (USDAIKentucky Agri- 
cultural Statistics Service 2002), with a combination of regulatory 
threats, changes in production structure that negatively impact inde- 
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pendent producers (i.e., loss of market outlets), and low prices the 
most likely explanations. Either industry reaction (tighter regulation 
or lack of investor interest in new CAFO operations), according to 
the pro-regulation position, will lessen the manufactured risk haz- 
ards from the state's animal agriculture industry. 
The type of social risk dangers that motivate the pro-regulation 
forces are conceptualized by Beck (1998; 1992) and Giddens 
(1998) as heralding a "risk society" stage of modernity that is glob- 
alizing in scope. In this new era, manufactured risks, the inevitable 
by-products of advanced industrial development, pose serious 
threats to human welfare, and, as a result, cause deep unease among 
the citizenry. Dealing with these risks becomes a pressing concern 
of government. In fact, Beck and Giddens have argued that twenty- 
first century politics, at least in the advanced industrial countries, 
may focus more on dealing with such problems (witness such recent 
debates over nuclear power, mad cow disease, global warming, 
etc.) than on traditional economic security concerns. 
However, the CAFO regulation debate in Kentucky showed that 
both the old economic security and the new complex technology 
risks remain very important foci in the arguments of the opposing 
sides, an indication of important social contradictions inherent in 
industrial restructuring in this era of globalization. One way to 
illuminate these contradictions is to note that the neoliberal public 
policy interventions that promote globalization within the world 
economy increase economic security risks to many producers (the 
social risk most feared by anti-regulation proponents) and advance 
the worldwide dissemination of production technologies by multina- 
tional corporate actors which, as in CAFO systems, magnify the 
potential for serious normal accidents (the social risk most feared by 
pro-regulation proponents). This double risk whammy of globaliza- 
tion processes breeds regulatory conflict. 
The Politics of Regulatory Response 
The social risk profiles outlined above that accompany livestock 
industry restructuring are political economy realities endemic to 
CAFO development in any locality in the United States. State-level 
responses to this dual risk policy dilemma emerge as regulatory 
politics and represent attempts to alter globalization trajectories at 
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the local level. In their survey of state regulations, Beghin and Met- 
calfe (2000) identify social structural, geographic, and temporal 
(length of experience with CAFO operations) variables as explana- 
tors of cross-state differences in regulatory regimes. While rural 
population density, agroclimate, and the timing of CAFO develop- 
ment are plausible catalysts for differential regulatory responses, 
location-specific constellations of political actors and policy domain 
structures and processes also provide essential keys to understand- 
ing local regulatory outcomes. Political action channeled by and 
through local institutional structures often effect what Kalb calls 
"glocalization" (2000: 13). 
Burstein (1991) and Kingdon (1995) provide important insights 
into the political dynamics of legislation such as CAFO regulatory 
regime action. Burstein's "policy domain" framework focuses on 
organizations as political agents in the legislative arena. Organiza- 
tions have both material and ideational resources they can use to 
further their members' political objectives on issues that matter to 
them. How they fare in the political arena is often the function of 
their strategic use of cultural tools (see Swidler 1985) to frame con- 
vincing arguments in policy debates. Kingdon's major contribution 
is his identification and explication of discrete steps in the legisla- 
tive process that political agents must navigate to enact their policy 
preferences into law. In addition, his work also increases awareness 
of the institutional contexts that channel routine political action and 
that affect legislative outcomes. 
In what follows, Kentucky CAFO regulatory response is ex- 
plored by showing how political agents within an organizational 
field of "environment and agriculture" politics developed policy 
arguments to influence legislation that authorized or opposed regu- 
lation (Burstein's policy domain analysis). This political action is 
examined through analyses of the issue emergence, alternative solu- 
tion, and adoption stages of the legislative process as specified in 
Kingdon's policy model. At the alternative solution stage of the 
process, we pause to assess how the Kentucky CAFO regulation 
debate highlights particular characteristics of risk politics that Beck 
and others argue reflect the risk society stage of modernity. 
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Emergence of a Policy Problem 
Our earlier description of CAFO regulation in Kentucky indicated 
that this issue has indeed been put on the policy agenda. As Beghin 
and Metcalfe (2000) suggest, social structural variables played a 
role. The state's demographics assured that CAFO facility siting 
would likely spark NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) objections. Ken- 
tucky is one of the most rural states in the United States, with a rela- 
tively large number of rural residences spread throughout the coun- 
tryside. Any prospective CAFO site is likely to affect a number of 
residences and generate constituent complaints that politicians must 
attend to. 
The temporal factor was also important in the Kentucky case. 
Being a relative latecomer to the CAFO investment sweepstakes, 
threatened neighbors were aware of a plethora of horror stories from 
surrounding states that experienced an influx of large-scale hog 
operations earlier in the 1990s (see examples in Thu and Durrenber- 
ger 1998, 1994). Information about a range of problems linked to 
CAFO development has been circulated widely in the media and by 
environmental and family farm advocacy groups and local NIMBY 
grassroots opponents of CAFOs (Bishop 1997a, 1997b; Community 
Farm Alliance 1997; Lindenberger 2000~). Narratives of hog lagoon 
stench, vermin- and fly-infested poultry litter, drastic declines in the 
quality of the ambient air environment of those unfortunate enough 
to live downwind of CAFOs, declines in property values of CAFO 
neighbors, and health risks to those living in close proximity to fac- 
tory farms were used widely to legitimate opposition to CAFO 
intrusion (author's fieldnotes). 
The quick response of the Kentucky governor, Paul Patton, to 
local level concerns about the siting of large-scale hog confinement 
facilities was also instrumental in putting CAFO regulation on the 
policy agenda. Before entering politics, Patton was an Eastern Ken- 
tucky coal company executive. He has personal experience with the 
protracted controversies surrounding environmental problems in 
that industry. As a result, he has argued that industry must confront 
environmental problems head-on, and that public policy must strike 
a balance between environmental concerns and economic growth 
(Patton 1998). While this political stance is not without its inconsis- 
tencies (i.e., his administration's subsidy of poultry processors as a 
rural development strategy), his gubernatorial tenure has been 
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marked by several high profile initiatives to deal with Kentucky's 
environmental problems (Mead 2001). As Kingdon (1995:Ch. 2) 
notes, issues make the policy agenda when the executive branch 
takes an interest in them and uses its institutional powers to further 
public debate about them. The Kentucky governor's power to issue 
administration regulations to cope with an "emergency," and the 
NREPC's (an executive branch agency) statutory authority to de- 
velop regulations and to conduct public hearings to vet the regula- 
tions established a routinized public venue for the regulation debate. 
Policy Players and Policy Alternatives 
The line-up of policy actors displayed earlier in Table 3 identifies an 
organizational field comprised of three sets of actors who routinely 
lobby the state legislature--mainstream agriculture interest groups, 
environmental organizations, and alternative agriculture and other 
progressive politics advocacy groups. Mainstream agriculture 
groups constructed policy lines that transformed their economic 
self-interest in minimal regulation into the general interest andfor 
widely shared values. The environment-alternative agriculture- 
progressive politics alliance, on the other hand, tried to develop 
policy lines that tied the public good of stricter regulation to existing 
or future private and community troubles (author's fieldnotes). 
These policy actors combined their ideas and interests into "causal 
stories" (Burstein 199 1) of the socioeconomic consequences of dif- 
ferent regulatory regimes. The construction and public dissemina- 
tion of these discourses constituted much of the policy debate sur- 
rounding this issue. 
A resonant causal story used by the anti-regulation proponents 
focused on current problems facing the Kentucky farm economy, 
the foremost being the collapse of the tobacco economy (author's 
fieldnotes). Historically, tobacco income has been the economic 
linchpin of many Kentucky farms. The federal tobacco program, 
which guaranteed farmers a profitable price in return for their 
agreement to institute supply management controls, is currently 
being undermined by substantial reductions in quota due to tobacco 
companies' increased global sourcing of leaf and the companies' 
attempts to dismantle the federal program through direct contracting 
with growers (i.e., the globalization of the tobacco industry) (see 
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Stull 2000). Loss of tobacco revenue requires diversification into 
other commodities if farm income is to be maintained. Mainstream 
agricultural interest groups argued that livestock production is one 
of the most viable alternatives to tobacco in Kentucky, and that 
stringent CAFO regulations will foreclose this option at least in the 
hog and poultry industries. CAFO regulations, in essence, were said 
to threaten a direct material loss to Kentucky agriculture by reduc- 
ing potential growth in livestock inventories and by foreclosing a 
potential in-state feedgrain market for CAFOs. 
This story was reinforced by other discourses that the anti- 
regulation forces hoped would sway policymakers and public opin- 
ion in their direction. Among the most important storylines em- 
ployed was the self-identification of farmers as "the true stewards of 
the land" (author's fieldnotes). This self-identity was proclaimed to 
allay fears about farmer-induced environmental degradation. Anti- 
regulation proponents asked rhetorically why any rational farmer, 
concerned with leaving the family farm as a legacy to hisher heirs, 
would engage in destructive environmental practices that would 
despoil the resources which sustain them economically and spiritu- 
ally. CAFO development was also portrayed in classical entrepre- 
neurial terms as "cutting edge technology" adopted by the most 
progressive farmers (author's fieldnotes). Adoption of new tech- 
nology was identified as the key to maintaining U.S. agricultural 
preeminence in the global economy. Another frequently employed 
discourse was to invoke the inviolate right of private property own- 
ers to develop their property as they choose (author's fieldnotes). 
These storylines, frequently invoked in policy debates by the anti- 
regulation proponents, resonate widely with the general public's 
preconceptions of farming, agriculture, and the American way. The 
construction of such storylines illustrates how policy actors' mate- 
rial and ideational interests combine to fashion a policy argument. 
The pro-regulation alliance's position, while trying to evoke 
sympathy for those who had already suffered damage as a result of 
their close proximity to CAFO operations, focused more on prevent- 
ing future environmental degradation and public health crises that 
may harm individuals and communities and cost taxpayers (author's 
fieldnotes). This emphasis put the pro-regulation forces on a dif- 
ferent footing in the policy debate, as future costs to society at 
large rather than immediate economic impact to specified target 
groups became the major rationale for policy promulgation. 
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The policy arguments of the pro-regulation coalition were 
grounded in critiques of the present agri-food system and in the 
visioning of expanded roles for agriculture in American society. 
CAFOs were portrayed as substantial public health risk threats due 
to waste run-off (e.g., groundwater contamination) and to animal 
production and processing practices that compromise food safety 
and the efficacy of essential antibiotics. Undoubtedly, recent media 
coverage of food safety scares has aided the pro-regulation cause by 
heightening public awareness of problems in the industrial food 
system. Appeals to the farming community centered on arguments 
about how CAFOs, as representatives of agribusiness oligopoly, 
were eroding the family farm and community social foundations of 
rural America through business and technology practices that are 
economically and environmentally exploitative (author's field- 
notes). They highlighted their strong support for the joint liability 
provision in the recent temporary regulations as legal protections 
for family farmers who have little leverage when negotiating a con- 
tract with a CAFO integrator. An often understated subtext in the 
pro-regulation discourse was that agriculture must move toward 
sustainable environmental and decentralized, locally-oriented agri- 
food system solutions to its current problems (author's fieldnotes). 
This vision provided an important linkage to environmental allies, 
as both the alternative agriculture and the environmental groups 
claim that agriculture is now much more than commodity produc- 
tion, with the provision of social goods like environmental ser- 
vices and landscape preservation equally important and deserving of 
policy support. This alliance is socially more tenuous than the more 
narrow-scope mainstream agriculture interest group coalition, as 
intramural squabbles about the reconciliation of farm economy 
needs with environmental protection demands make the establish- 
ment of common policy ground a more taxing political challenge. 
Risk Politics and the Policy Debate 
The signal characteristic of the new era of risk politics was illus- 
trated by the role of science in the policy debate. Both pro- and 
anti-regulation proponents routinely produced scientific evidence in 
support of their policy positions (author's fieldnotes) (see Tesh 
2000:Ch 5 for a good discussion of this environmental policy real- 
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ity). Legislators and the general public must then weigh this con- 
flicting evidence in their evaluation of the merits of competing pol- 
icy lines. According to Beck, this situation represents the essential 
dilemma of the risk society era. Science is exposed for what it 
really is-an intellectual process wherein scientific findings are con- 
tinually challenged by ongoing research, resulting in controversy 
and uncertainty about the ultimate validity of what is currently 
known. The scientific community has not effectively communi- 
cated this matter-of-fact situation to policymakers and the lay public 
who find it difficult to evaluate contradictory scientific evidence. 
Rather, the scientific community has chosen to increase its institu- 
tional power by fostering the notion that science generates "solu- 
tions" to all sorts of human problems through technological fixes 
developed through the application of its scientific expertise (Beck 
1992:5 1-71). 
The anti-regulation forces were somewhat successful in linking 
their position to scientific authorities who were better known to 
state policymakers and the general public. In the CAFO regulation 
policy debate, continual references were made to the "sound sci- 
ence" behind CAFO technology and "reasonable" regulatory stan- 
dards (author's fieldnotes). Research by land grant university scien- 
tists, a group of experts who are relatively well-known to the lay 
public as specialists in agri-food system science and technology, 
was often cited by anti-regulation proponents in support of their 
positions regarding the productivity, safety, and self-regulatory at- 
tributes of CAFO systems. The other side in the debate was casti- 
gated for adopting "emotional" and "unscientific" positions that are 
"irrational" in modem society. Although the pro-regulation forces 
brought their own scientific expertise to support their position, this 
evidence came from less familiar sources ( e.g., public interest re- 
search groups). Neither the pro-regulation proponents nor the regu- 
lators (the NREPC) took time to educate policymakers and the gen- 
eral public about the routinization of scientific conflict that Beck 
and others argue characterize any public debate over what to do 
about manufactured risk, a discourse strategy that might have chal- 
lenged land grant university scientists' evaluations of CAFO risk. 
The science issue carries over to the other key element of risk 
politics, the specter of heightened public regulatory interference in 
private business and business reaction to that prospect. Technologi- 
cal processes, adopted by businesses to enhance profits in a dynamic 
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marketplace, may now be increasingly subject to scrutiny and regu- 
lation by the government as a result of well-publicized manufac- 
tured risk threats. In the eyes of risk society proponents, this marks 
a new era in business-society-government relations. This issue sur- 
faced routinely in the public discourse on the Kentucky CAFO regu- 
lations. Anti-regulatory proponents argued that they are the experts 
in the technologies they employ and that society should accord them 
decision-making autonomy in this arena (author's fieldnotes). The 
Kentucky regulations, which were promulgated within the NREPC 
without much public knowledge of the process and the players, had 
a "black box" appearance that was easily attacked by those who 
favor a laissez-faire regulatory approach. "Who is making the regu- 
lations and what is their expertise" were rhetorical questions fre- 
quently asked. The implication was, of course, that this is another 
case of bureaucracy run amok. Regulators, it was argued, did not 
know the location-specific technological attributes and the eco- 
nomic competition demands of businesses they regulate, and hence 
are not in a position to write authoritative rules. In an era of skepti- 
cism about government regulation (a product of neoliberal ideology 
that undergirds the globalization project), this policy line resonated 
strongly in the debate. 
The Legislative Impasse 
The protracted impasse over a regulatory regime illustrated further 
the nature of risk politics. The telltale sign in the Kentucky case 
was the heightened power of administrative agencies vis-a-vis legis- 
lators in the construction of a regulatory regime. Since contested 
science does not present clear answers to legislators and their con- 
stituents, the political space for administrative agencies to adjudi- 
cate scientific uncertainties over how to deal with manufactured risk 
expands. After all, personnel in administrative agencies are often 
more knowledgeable about the technical details of the issues they 
handle on a routine basis than are legislators. They have policy- 
making advantages in terms of access to information and in terms of 
understanding how a policy issue has evolved over time in response 
to the concerns of groups with varying material and ideational inter- 
ests. This institutional power puts administrators in a favorable 
position as a source of policy alternatives and/or solutions. Legisla- 
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tors can react, but they often lack the time and resources to chal- 
lenge agency expertise on technical issues. 
As Bosso (1987) and others have noted, the expansion of the 
agriculture issue area beyond the "iron triangle" of farm groups, 
departments of agriculture, and rural legislators means that the or- 
ganizational field of political action has expanded to encompass a 
much wider range of interests and ideas. The intra-state politics of 
CAFO regulation in Kentucky mirrored what has happened at the 
federal level when environmental and agricultural issues are inter- 
twined. Analogous to conflicts between USDA and EPA, in Ken- 
tucky the Department of Agriculture is beholden to a farm group 
clientele and consistently supports an anti-regulation position in the 
policy debate. The Natural Resources and Environmental Protec- 
tion Cabinet, on the other hand, has been the lead advocate of 
broadening the scope of regulated industry to include agriculture in 
its attempts to deal with various environmental problems such as 
water quality. While environmental groups do constitute a counter- 
vailing organizational field that can be mobilized to support NREPC 
actions, these groups are not clientelistic in the sense of the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture-commodity/farm group relationship. NREPC 
actions often do not satisfy the environmental community. As in the 
case of EPA regulatory action, the politics of serving the diffuse 
general interest rather than particular local interests made it more 
difficult for the NREPC to secure political support in the legislature 
for making its regulations permanent. The political imbalance is 
exacerbated in Kentucky by the fact that the Agricultural Commis- 
sioner is an elected official, whereas the NREPC head is appointed 
by the governor. 
After the initial executive branch promulgation of CAFO regula- 
tions in 1997, Republican capture of the upper house (Senate) from 
the Democrats produced a less friendly legislative environment for 
the Patton administration. However, for several years, the admini- 
stration successfully bottled up anti-regulation challenges in the 
legislature. Rural legislators from western Kentucky districts with a 
poultry CAFO presence routinely introduced bills that gutted provi- 
sions in the Cabinet's regulations that they (and their constituents in 
the livestock industry) saw as most onerous, particularly the integra- 
tor liability provision (Associated Press 2000b). Democratic chairs 
in committees in the lower house with jurisdiction over this issue 
were able to table these bills (Associated Press 2000a). The fact 
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that industrial hog farm expansion had been stalled by the tempo- 
rary regulations weakened the anti-regulation forces, as entrenched 
lobbying pressures from this segment of the industry were not yet 
well established. 
However, the strategy of the anti-regulation proponents to pit 
legislative prerogatives against administrative authority seems to 
have worked. In effect, the sine qua non of risk politics, its empow- 
erment of technical administrative agencies vis-a-vis lawmakers, 
was used to bring down a regulatory challenge to an industry that 
created new manufactured social risks. A relatively strong state 
regulatory apparatus in Kentucky has, it seems, been weakened by 
opponents' clever political use of the aforementioned administrative 
biases embedded in risk politics. Even Democrats in the Kentucky 
legislature who normally supported Patton voted for House Bill 728 
(a defacto vote against the CAFO regulatory regime) when the regu- 
latory issue was reframed as executive branch usurpation of their 
lawmaking authority (Brammer 200 1 ; Wolfe 200 1 ). 
This brief exposition of the political factors influencing the Ken- 
tucky regulatory outcome suggests variables which might be con- 
sidered in future cross-state and cross-national analyses of regula- 
tory regimes in the livestock industry. Ruralfurban demographics, 
the institutional power of the executive versus legislative branch, 
intra-state agency configurations and conflicts, agricultural com- 
modity profiles, levels of political party competition, and ideologi- 
cal currents that affect political action are explanatory contenders. 
Systematic comparative research on regulatory regimes at both the 
state and national levels is needed to flush out model specifications 
with explanatory potential. Such comparative research will provide 
more knowledge of what types of local environments generate what 
types of location-specific alterations of globalization dynamics. 
Conclusion: Globalization, Regulation, and the 
Future of Rural Places 
The vertically-integrated swine and poultry industries incorporate 
many of the defining characteristics of a globalizing world econ- 
omy-multinational firm market concentration, diffusion of new 
business forms with spatial disaggregation of "component" produc- 
tion processes, and the development of global technology standards. 
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Although not addressed explicitly in this paper, the dependence on 
immigrant labor is also quite pronounced, another defining attribute 
of globalization processes (Gouveia 1994; Grey 1999; Stanley 
1994). The heightened manufactured risk profile associated with 
CAFO development has generated fierce political contestation over 
regulations to deal with environmental, public health, and commu- 
nity well-being problems associated with industry restructuring. 
While this paper used a case study of state-level regulation initia- 
tives to explore the political economy of risk profiles that spark 
regulatory debate and the risk politics dynamics that influence regu- 
latory action, the complexity of the U.S. federal system of govern- 
ance must be dealt with explicitly in future analyses of CAFO regu- 
lation outcomes. As mentioned earlier in this analysis, the promul- 
gation of federal USDAJEPA CAFO guidelines initiated by the 
Clinton administration to address agricultural pollution problems 
under Clean Water Act mandates (see EPA 200 1 ; Kaplan, Johans- 
son and Peters 2002) spurred Kentucky authorities to expand the 
scope of CAFO regulations to include beef cattle and dairy opera- 
tions. Thus, pro-regulation forces found federal action supportive in 
their attempts to promote a more comprehensive regulatory regime. 
As widely anticipated, the Bush administration has recently revised 
these guidelines in ways that pro-regulation forces argue are too 
friendly to the animal agriculture industry (Becker 2002). In the 
course of the Kentucky regulatory debate, anti-regulation forces 
have used federal guidelines as "maximalist" standards in court 
action contesting the lawfulness of state-promulgated temporary 
regulations. Now, with a more laissez-faire regulation stance at the 
federal level, anti-regulation forces may be in an even stronger posi- 
tion to thwart any new state-level initiatives to institute regulations 
that go beyond the federal guidelines. Thus, at various times in the 
unfolding of the Kentucky regulatory debate, opposing sides have 
found federal actions sometimes supportive and sometimes damag- 
ing to their initiatives. In the United States, "glocalization" re- 
sponses to CAFO development are established within a complex 
matrix of federal-state-local regulatory actions and prerogatives that 
complicates regulatory politics and administrative rule-making. 
Such "glocalization" responses will determine, in part, the future 
character of rural places in the United States and elsewhere (see 
Egan 2002). Competing developmental visions now vie for political 
support in many rural localities. At one extreme is the position of 
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the agriculture industry in the United States. According to this 
view, successful agricultural development strategies (which should 
remain a cornerstone of comprehensive rural development pro- 
grams) must follow the CAFO track-that is, investment in high 
technology, capital intensive agricultural commodity production 
systems that can compete in deregulated global markets (Beghin and 
Metcalf 2000; Rhodes 1995; Smith 2001). At the other extreme are 
advocates of revitalization of rural places through emphasis on the 
preservation and/or enhancement of social amenities (clean air, pas- 
toral landscape, specialty product identity, gemeinschaft social rela- 
tions) that many citizens of advanced industrial societies now asso- 
ciate with the countryside (Marsden 1999). In rural areas where 
animal agriculture remains important in economic and/or sociocul- 
tural terms, the kind of regulatory responses described in the Ken- 
tucky case study will be important factors in determining where 
rural places are located on this development continuum. 
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